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Sweden deregulated the prices for dental services in 1999. Twenty-one Swedish county 
councils provide public dental services. They compete with 3000 small independent private 
firms. Public and private providers are subsidized by the government to an equal extent, but 
most of the costs are borne by the consumers. The private firms’ price setting is strongly 
influenced by the county councils’ prices after the deregulation, i.e. the county councils act as 
price leaders. Prices increased more in large markets, which is consistent with dental services 
being a reputation good. There was no effect of the dentist’s gender on prices, but immigrant 
dentists increased their prices slightly less than native ones. 
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I Introduction 
 
The removal of a price ceiling was the most important part of a reform of the regulation 
of the dental services industry in Sweden. The reform was implemented on January 1, 1999. 
Before the reform, the national government provided subsidies for dental treatments, 
conditional on the dentists not setting prices higher than the ceiling. In practice, all dentists 
charged the maximum price allowed. After the reform, the government subsidies were given 
regardless of the prices charged. About one third of the dentists in Sweden work for the public 
dental services provided by the 21 Swedish county councils (the local government at the 
county level) and the remaining two thirds for private firms. The National Social Insurance 
Board of Sweden collected the prices for all providers of dental services a few months after 
the reform. In this paper, I use these price data to test for price leadership, and the reputation 
goods effects model of Satterthwaite (1979). I also discuss whether the aims of the reform 
were fulfilled, and investigate the effects of the dentist’s gender and immigrant status on 
prices. 
The prices used before the price deregulation were intended to reflect the costs. The 
Swedish government was worried that the ceiling was serving as a focal point for implicit 
price collusion. In that case, a removal of the price ceiling could lead to increased competition 
and lower prices. The government also put forward a number of other reasons for 
deregulating the prices of dental services. The conditions for a deregulation were viewed as 
favorable as there was a surplus of dentists, which was supposed to curb price increases. The 
fact that a substantial fraction of the population was unwilling to pay for dental services at the 
regulated price was interpreted as an indication of high price elasticity among consumers. 
However, as will been seen below, this turned out to be a misconception. The county 
councils’ public dental services which provides a large share of the dental services, is not 
allowed to price above costs. This was considered to also limit the price increases of private 
firms, as they compete with the county councils’ public dental services. It was also noted that 
all organizations of providers favored a deregulation of prices. (I leave it to the reader to judge 
whether this is a convincing argument for deregulating prices from a consumer point of view.) 
Finally, if the outcome of the deregulation was not the desired, the government claimed that it 
would not hesitate to reintroduce regulated prices, see the Swedish Government (1998). 
Private dental firms are usually very small, only employing one or a few dentists. The 
national government provides subsidies for dental services to both the county councils’ public 
dental services and private firms, and consumers are free to choose between public and   2
private dental services. The subsidy covers about one third of the consumer costs, which were 
the same for both public and private dental services before the reform. After the reform, prices 
vary widely between providers of dental services, both among public and private providers. 
The county council sets prices for the public dental services in each county, which gives rise 
to regional price differences for public dental services between counties after the price 
deregulation. Market concentration is quite low which, in a standard model, would mean that 
a single firm would not be able to affect market prices to any large extent. On the other hand, 
the county council’s public dental services are much larger than any private firm in each 
county, and its prices may therefore work as a focal point. Furthermore, the county councils’ 
set prices in public sessions. A natural question is thus if the county councils’ public dental 
services act as price leaders. 
In the literature on price leadership, it is common to distinguish between three types of 
price leadership (Scherer and Ross, 1990). Dominant firm price leadership means that one 
firm, which is much larger than other firms, acts like a monopolist, by setting a monopoly 
price, after subtracting the supply of the small firms. The small firms’ prices are then 
determined by the dominant firms’ pricing decision. Dominant firm price leadership has 
received attention in several older empirical studies, see Schereer and Ross (1990), but less 
attention in recent studies. Collusive models of price leadership have, on the other hand, been 
the subject of several recent theoretical studies, see Deneckere and Konvenock (1992) and 
van Damme and Hurkens (2004); for the most recent references, see the latter study. Price 
leadership acts as a device to uphold price collusion in these models. The models assume 
strategic interaction between firms. In the Swedish dental care market, the county councils’ 
public dental services is much larger than any of the individual private firms with which they 
compete, so a priori, it seems unlikely that the dental care market in Sweden would be 
characterized by collusive price leadership, since there is no sufficiently large private firm to 
interact strategically with the county councils’ public dental services. Finally, there is 
barometric price leadership, where one firm collects information on costs and/or demand 
before other firms and thus lead price changes, in the sense that it sets its prices before other 
firms, but without being able to influence the prices. In this paper, I will investigate to what 
extent private firms follow the prices of their county council’s public dental services and 
relate the findings to the theories on price leadership.  
Dental services are a reputation good, where the main source of information about the 
quality of suppliers is other consumers.  The buyer of dental services must actually consume 
the good to evaluate a dentist, or talk to someone with experience of the dentist. An increase   3
in market size may decrease price sensitivity among consumers in the reputation good model 
of Satterthwaite (1979), since it is harder to obtain information about a particular dentist if she 
only serves a small fraction of the market. Intuitively, if a consumer becomes dissatisfied with 
her dentist, it is harder to obtain references about another dentist in a large market. The most 
likely response in a large city when asking a friend whether a particular dentist is good is that 
the friend has never heard about her. In a small city, is easier to find people who can give 
references for a particular dentist. 
Finally, the dental services industry shows a mix in gender and immigrant status of 
dentists, and I will investigate the effects of gender and immigrant status of dentists on prices.  
 
II Data description 
The price data collected by the National Social Insurance Board have several 
advantages. The Board requested prices from all providers of dental services and the response 
rate was high. In the large city counties of Stockholm, Västra Götaland and Skåne, the 
response rate was 59, 44 and 50 percent, respectively. In one other county, the response rate 
was 44 percent, in the remaining counties the response rates were all above 84 percent. The 
price changes in counties with a low response rate do not differ considerably from price 
changes in other counties, which indicates that sample selection bias is unlikely to be a severe 
problem. There are different latitudes (levels of difficulty) of treatments and some other 
variations in the exact definition of a treatment. A dentist has therefore studied all price lists 
on behalf of the Swedish National Social Insurance Board to ensure that prices are 
comparable. I have also chosen to study relatively standardized treatments to ensure that 
prices are comparable between dentists. In total, 1800 private firms responded and 61347 
prices were reported, which allows an analysis of the effects of the price deregulation on 
different treatments and for different geographical areas. The municipality is known for most 
firms, and the county is known for all.  
 
The market and regulation 
The 21 county councils set the prices for public dental services independently in each county 
after the price deregulation. The government subsidies were related to consumers’ costs 
before the price deregulation. After the reform, the subsidies from the national government 
were concentrated to “base care” such as standard examinations, prophylaxis, and emergency 
treatments, which is considered to contribute to long-run dental health. Prosthetic dentistry is   4
not subsidized after the deregulation, except for disabled or sick people. In this paper, I will 
only study base care treatments. Public and private providers of dental services receive the 
same subsidies. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
The county councils are not allowed to set prices above, or below, the costs, since they 
are not allowed to profit from or subsidize their production. There is a very large dispersion in 
prices among county councils as can be seen from the minimum and maximum values of 
price changes in Table 1. The very large difference in price changes for a given treatment, and 
also between treatments for a given county, makes it questionable whether the price changes 
in reality reflect differences in costs between county councils. Indeed, a report from  the 
National Social Insurance Board states that such large cost differences between county 
councils seem unlikely (RFV, 1999). 
 
Product description 
I study seven treatments in detail. The selected treatments have been chosen in order to 
provide a variety of traits. 
Standard examination: This is the treatment most likely to be compared by consumers. 
Consumers usually go to the dentist for a standard examination once a year. The need 
for more treatments may be discovered during a standard examination. The costs for 
additional treatments are not covered for by the cost for the standard examination. 
Standard examinations are subsidized for consumers aged 18-29, and the prices 
collected are for this group. Prices for older people were not collected, but were usually 
the same. 
X-ray single picture: This treatment is cheap and very standardized. 
X-ray mouth: This treatment is medium priced and very standardized. 
Prophylaxis: This treatment provides an investment in future dental health. 
Removal of tooth by operation: This treatment is comparatively expensive. 
Root canal filling: This is a relatively common and comparatively expensive treatment. 
Emergency treatment: Consumers are least likely to shop around for an emergency treatment. 
Note that the emergency treatment had the same price as a standard examination under 
the regulated price scheme used before the deregulation, but is much higher afterwards. 
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Table 2 shows then mean price changes after the price deregulation for the seven treatments 
studied for county councils’ public dental services and private dental firms. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Variable description 
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the econometric 
analysis. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
The 21 Swedish counties set prices independently. COUNTYCOUNCIL_PRICE is the 
price of a treatment by the county council’s public dental services in the county where the 
private dental firm is active. The variable is used to test whether the county council’s price for 
a treatment affects the price of the same treatment by private firms. There is a large variation 
between the prices of different counties.  In a report regarding county councils’ dental 
services, the Swedish National Social Insurance Board claims that there is “no uniform line of 
pricing among the counties and differences between counties are unlikely to be explained by 
differences in costs”, (RFV, 1999). It is not uncommon that a county council increases the 
price for one treatment more than other county councils, but increases its price less than other 
county councils for other treatments. Thus, it seems that the price for an individual treatment 
by an individual county council contains a random component, not reflecting costs. This 
random component is very useful for testing price leadership. 
The mean increase in the county council’s price for dental services, 
∆M.COUNTYCOUNCIL_PRICE, is computed as the mean increase in percentage points for 
the treatments in the data, except the treatment studied. Thus, in regressions studying the 
determinants of prices of, for example, a standard examination by private firms, COUNTY-
COUNCIL_PRICE is the price of a Standard examination by the county council’s public 
dental services in the county where the private firm is active and ∆M.COUNTY-
COUNCIL_PRICE is the mean percentage increase for all treatments in the data, excluding 
the standard examination, by the county council in the county where the firm is active. The 
variable ∆M.COUNTYCOUNCIL_PRICE will be used to control for price changes common 
for all treatments of the county council’s public dental services.   6
In 1999, there were 289 municipalities in Sweden. All counties but one cover a number 
of municipalities, which vary in size and mean per capita income. The county councils are 
required by law to set the same price in all municipalities, but private firms are free to adjust 
their prices to local demand conditions. The size of the local market may affect the price. The 
standard prediction would be that a large market will increase the number of firms and 
thereby competition, but if the market works as in the reputation good model by Satterthwaite 
(1979), we would expect less competition in large markets. The size of the market is 
measured as the natural logarithm of the population of a municipality, Ln(POPULATION). 
Local demand may be affected by the mean disposable income in a municipality, INCOME. 
Statistics Sweden has collected data on Ln(POPULATION) and INCOME, and these data for 
1999, are used in this study. 
In most cases, it is possible to tell the dentist’s gender from the name of the firm. I have 
used this to construct a number of dummy variables for gender: MALE for male dentists, 
MIXEDSEX for firms with both male and female dentists and UNKNOWNSEX for firms 
where it is impossible to tell the dentists’ gender. The default category is female dentists. One 
drawback of these variables is that it is possible that a firm is named after one dentist, though 
the firm employs several dentists. Variables for immigrant status are defined in a similar way, 
with IMMIGRANT for dentists with non-Swedish names, MIXEDIMM for firms containing 
both Swedish and non-Swedish names, and UNKNOWNIMM for firms with names that do not 
provide any information of the dentists’ origin. The same drawback as for gender variables, 
with the possibility of a number of dentists in the same firm, occurs for these variables. 
Furthermore, a non-Swedish name does not necessarily mean that the dentist was not born in 
Sweden, and dentists with Swedish names could be immigrants.  
 
III Econometric Analysis 
The private dental firms’ prices for the seven treatments studied are estimated in 
separate OLS regressions. Two hypotheses are tested. 
Hypothesis 1: The county councils act as price leaders, i.e. a county council’s prices for 
public dental services have a positive effect on the prices of the private firms in the county. 
Hypothesis 2: According to the reputation good model of Satterthwaite (1979), an 
increase in market size may lead to an increase in prices.  
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Further, the effects of gender and immigrant status are investigated, though no specific 
hypotheses are tested. 
 
Empirical specification: 
Price (treatment i) = Constant + county council price (of treatment i)  
+ mean county council price change (excluding treatment i)  
+ (logarithmed) municipal population + mean municipal income  
+ gender (captured by 3 dummy variables)  
+ immigrant status (captured by 3 dummy variables) 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
Table 4 shows the regression results for the seven treatments studied. The dependent 
variable is the price of private dental firms. One county council decreased the price for a 
Standard examination by 70 percent, probably for political reasons. This very large price 
decrease reduces the explanatory power of the OLS regression for Standard examination. In 
an alternative OLS regression for Standard examination, Column 2 in Table 4, this county is 
excluded, and the results for Standard examination become very similar to those for other 
treatments.  
According to Hypothesis 1 a private dental firm will follow the price of the county 
council in the area in which it is active, i.e. there will be a positive sign on COUNTY-
COUNCIL_PRICE. We find a strongly significant effect of COUNTYCOUNCIL_PRICE on 
prices for all treatments, with estimates between 0.117 and 0.594, which is what Hypothesis 1 
predicts.  
Before drawing the conclusion that there is a causal effect of COUNTY-
COUNCIL_PRICE on the price of private firms, we must address the possibility that there are 
common cost or demand differences, in for example wages and rents or income, that make 
both county councils and private firms adjust prices in the same way. If this is the case, the 
prices for other treatments will vary in the same way for both county councils and private 
firms in a county. This would also look as a price leader effect. To control for this, the mean 
change in the county council’s prices for other treatments, ∆M.COUNTYCOUNCIL_PRICE, 
is included in the regression. A county council with high costs would increase all its prices 
more than the average. The effect of COUNTYCOUNCIL_PRICE on the prices of private 
firms is both statistically and economically strongly significant, and the obvious alternative   8
explanations of a common difference in costs or demand are controlled for, by the inclusion 
of ∆M.COUNTYCOUNCIL_PRICE.  This gives strong support to Hypothesis 1. As seen in 
Table 3, there is not a positive relation between the increase in a county council firm’s price 
for other treatments and the price for a treatment by private firms. Thus, the prices of private 
firms follow the county councils’ prices treatment by treatment, not across treatments.  
We observe price leadership, but of which type? Collusive price leadership seems 
unlikely given the market structure, with no firm sufficiently large to strategically interact 
with the county councils’ public dental services. The county councils arguably have larger 
resources to collect information on costs and demand, which is consistent with barometric 
price leadership. However, the very large and unsystematic differences in price changes 
between different county councils seem to suggest that the county councils do not use very 
exact information about costs for their pricing decisions. The market structure with one large 
and many small suppliers fits the model of dominant firm price leadership. However, the 
market share for public dental services is only about 1/3 in Sweden and a dominant firm is 
supposed to have a market share of at least 50% (Scherer and Ross, 1990). Furthermore, the 
price increase of public dental services is, on average, much lower than that of the private 
dental firms. If the county councils acted as monopolists, deducting the supply of the private 
firms, they would raise, not lower, their prices relative to private firms.  
To sum up, none of the theories on price leadership seems to fit the data. The existence 
of price leadership in the Swedish dental care market is nevertheless both statistically and 
economically very significant. To understand pricing formation in this market is of 
importance for regulators, so more theoretical research would be of interest. Consumers are 
very unwilling to change dentists. My guess is that a model incorporating customer stocks 
would be able to provide a better understanding of the pricing in the Swedish dental care 
market, as well as other markets with similar characteristics. 
According to Hypothesis 2, we would expect a positive sign on Ln(POPULATION), i.e. 
a positive relation between market size and price. The regressions in Table 3 show significant 
support for this for six of the seven treatments. It is possible that high income is positively 
related to the population of a municipality. This relationship is controlled for by the inclusion 
of INCOME in the regressions.   
If the prices set by the county councils are affected by the reputation good mechanism, 
they will increase their prices relatively more in counties that, on average, have municipalities 
with large populations, and part of the reputation good mechanism will be captured by 
COUNTYCOUNCIL_PRICE. A county council must set the same prices in all municipalities   9
in the county. Thus COUNTYCOUNCIL_PRICE is a function of market conditions, for 
example the population in all municipalities of the county. One way of avoiding this problem 
is to use differences in the population between municipalities within a county. Table 5 shows 
the results for county-fixed effects regressions. The same dependent variables as for the OLS-
regression are included, except the county-specific variables.  
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
The results from the county fixed effects regressions also support Hypothesis 2 for six 
of the treatments. The point estimates are slightly higher than for the OLS-regressions, which 
is compatible with some of the reputation good effects being captured by COUNTY-
COUNCIL_PRICE in the OLS regressions. 
There are no effects of gender on prices, neither in the OLS nor in the fixed effects 
regressions. There is a lack of control variables for the dentist’s individual characteristics. 
Ideally, one would like to control for differences in e.g. age and number of years in the 
profession. Thus, it is not possible to draw any strong conclusions about the impact of gender 
on prices. 
There is a very significant negative effect of IMMIGRANT on prices. In the OLS 
regressions, the effects range between 0.9 and 6.9 percent of the mean price of a treatment, 
with a mean of 4.5. The county-fixed effects estimates range between 1.2 and 6.3 percent, 
with a mean of 4.0. The cause of the negative effect of IMMIGRANT on prices is uncertain, 
since the lack of background data on dentists makes it impossible to control for the number of 
years in the profession. 
Although the lack of control variables makes it impossible to draw any strong 
conclusions from the estimates for gender and immigrant status, these estimates are still 
mentioned, as they point to an avenue for future research. With more background data, this 
market would be very well suited for studies of market gender or immigrant discrimination as 
the Swedish dental care market provides a mix of genders and immigrant/native dentists and 
contains self-employed dentists who set their own prices in private firms, as well as dentists 
employed by the comparatively large public dental services organizations. 
 
   10
IV The long-run effects of the price deregulation 
The data used in this paper were collected in the spring of 1999, immediately after the 
deregulation of prices. After the price deregulation, the prices of the county councils’ public 
dental services increased by 13 percent, on average, and the prices of private dental services 
by 21 percent, on average, for the seven treatments studied in this paper. The large and 
unexpected price increases have lead to an ongoing interest in the prices of dental services 
from the National Social Insurance Board. A few follow-up studies with much smaller 
samples of dentists have been conducted. The smaller sample sizes make these data less 
suitable for the kind of analysis carried out in this paper, but they are sufficiently large to give 
an accurate description of price changes for dental services on a national level. The large price 
increases immediately after the price deregulation were followed by price increases of 6-26 
percent for different treatments in the period 2000-2002.  
At the time of the reform, the demand for dental services was considered to be highly 
price elastic. However, in a Gallup survey conducted as part of the National Social Insurance 
Board’s evaluation of the reform, only 12 percent of the consumers would change dentists if 
another dentist located at a reasonable distance from their current dentist offered slightly 
lower prices. If a dentist at a reasonable distance offered treatment at half the price, 57 percent 
would still stick to their current dentist. When asked whether dentists are allowed to freely set 
prices, 34 percent agreed (correct answer), 35 percent disagreed (wrong answer) and 31 
percent did not know. The lack of information among consumers and the low willingness to 
change dentists found in the Gallup survey is consistent with the large price increases 
observed after the deregulation of prices. 
 
V Conclusion 
In each of Sweden’s 21 counties, both county councils and a large number of small 
independent private firms provide dental services. Public and private dental services are 
subsidized to the same extent. Until 1998 prices were regulated, but after January 1, 1999 
prices are unregulated. In this paper I use price data collected immediately after the price 
deregulation for seven dental treatments. 
County councils’ public dental services are much larger than any individual private firm 
and county councils decide on price changes in public sessions. In this paper I test if county 
councils act as price leaders. There are large differences in both mean price changes and the 
pattern of price changes across treatments for the county councils’ public dental services after   11
the deregulation of prices. It thus seems as prices for an individual treatment by an individual 
county council contains a random component. This is very useful for testing price leadership, 
since it provide a source of variation in price leader’s price for an identical product. It thus 
becomes possible to relate the price change of the price leader to the price changes of the 
followers, although we only have data colleted at a single point in time. A positive relation 
between county councils’ and private firms’ prices could be explained by common cost or 
demand differences between regional markets. This possibility is controlled for by including 
the mean price change for other treatments in the regressions. There is a, both statistically and 
economically, very significant positive relationship between prices for private firms and 
county councils, even when common cost or demand differences is controlled for, i.e. the 
county councils act as price leaders. None of the standard theories on price leadership, 
collusive, dominant firm, and barometric fits the Swedish dental services market. Price 
leadership is still observed, which would motivate more theoretical research on price 
leadership. 
The second finding is that prices increase more in large markets, even when consumer 
income is controlled for. This may seem surprising as a large market can support more firms, 
which leads to increased competition in most models. However, the dental care market fits the 
assumptions of the reputation goods model by Satterthwaite (1979), where an increased 
number of firms can decrease competition, as it becomes more costly for consumers to 
acquire information on the quality and price of a given dentist.   12
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Table 1. Price Changes in Percentages for County Council Public Dental Services. 
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Table 2. Price Changes in Percentages for Private and County Council Public Dental 
Services. 
 























































Mean Price Change    12.9  20.8 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics (Sample for X-ray Single Picture) 
 Variable  Mean
(Std Dev.)
Min Max Unit 
        





20 35  SEK 





0.951 23.6  Percentage   
increase 
Municipal var.        
INCOME  178 
(21.0) 
140 306  SEK*1000 
        
 POPULATION  204316 
(259026) 
3244 743703 Individuals 
 Ln(POPULATION)  11.4 
(1.31) 
8.08 13.5   
        
Dummy var.        
 MALE  0.661 
(0.473) 
0 1  Dummy 
        
 MIXEDSEX  0.105 
(0.307) 
0 1  Dummy 
        
 UNKNOWNSEX  0.0401 
(0.196) 
0 1  Dummy 
        
 IMMIGRANT  0.0628 
(0.242) 
0 1  Dummy 
        
 MIXEDIMM  0.00658 
(0.0809) 
0 1  Dummy 
        
 UNKNOWNIMM  0.0149 
(0.121) 
0 1  Dummy 
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Mean price  372.4 372.5  27.1  463.3  221.5  1204  1312.4  458.9 
               
Intercept  336*** 
(14.2) 
306.8*** 
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Number of obs.  1560  1519  1666  1531  1631  1596  1666  1346 
Adj R
2 0.013  0.017  0.117  0.061  0.018  0.094  0.201  0.100 
 
Standard deviations are in parenthesis, ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.  17















Root filling  Emergency 
Treatment 
Mean price  372.4 372.5  27.1  463.3  221.5  1204  1312.4  458.9 
                 
Municipal var.                
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Number of obs.  1560  1519  1666  1529  1631  1596  1666  1346 
Adj R
2 0.075  0.076  0.164  0.080  0.028  0.116  0.218  0.128 
Standard deviations are in parenthesis, ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.  18
 